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No. 57.

STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. LLOYD L. GAINES,
PETITIONER,

vs.
S. W. CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
MISSOURI, AND THE CURATORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI,
RESPONDENTS.

PE,T ITION OF T'H E RESP0NDENTS FOR A
REHEARING.
1

Come now the above-named respondents, S. W. Canada, registrar of the University of Missouri, and the curators of the University of Missouri, and present this, their
petition for a rehearing of the above-entitled cause, and,
in support thereof, respectfully show:
I.
The court's co,n struction of the equal prote·ction clauseapplied in this case is not in accord with prio,r interpretations of the clause by this court, and is erroneous.
1

In holdi~g that the State of Missouri is bound to furnish Gaines equal facilities for legal educ~tion within its
own borders, and cannot satisfy his constitutional right
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to equal protection by furnishing such facilities in an adjacent state university, the court has construed and applied
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
in a manner not justified by its language, and not in accordance with the settled construction of the clause as
heretofore applied by this Honorable Court.
The court holds that the question whether the provision for the legal education in other states of negroes
resident in Missouri is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal protection, is "the pivot upon
which this case turns" (page 6 of printed opinion). The
court then says that the relative ad,.vantages of legal education within and without the State are matters beside
the point; that the validity of laws separating the races
rests wholly upon the equality of privileges given to the
separated groups "within the State" (page 6); that the
State's obligation of equal protection "can be performed
only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction"; that "it is there that the equality of legal right
must be maintained" (page 7); and that the State was
bound to furnish Gaines equal facilities _for legal education "within its borders" (page 8). The court concludes
that Gaines was entitled to be admitted to the law school
of the University of Missouri "in the absence of other
and proper provision for his legal training within the
State" (page 9) .
The equal protection clause provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." The court in this case has construed the words "within its jurisdiction" to mean that
the State of Missouri must provide legal instruction for
Gaines within its borders, and may not satisfy his con~
(All italics in quotations are ours.)
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stitutio nal rigl1t to equal protect ion by contrac ting or
arrang ing, at the State's expens e, for his legal educat ion
in a nearby adjace nt state univer sity, regardl ess of the
high quality of legal educat ion there availab le to him.
This is a new interpr etation of the equal protect ion
clause, and one which (so far as our researc h discloses)
has never before been applied by this Honora ble Court.
Hereto fore the phrase "withi n its jurisdi ction" has been
interpr eted merely as limitin g the guaran ty of equal protection of the laws to person s who are physica lly within
the territo rial jurisdi ction of the State. The phrase has
heretof ore been constru ed as definin g the persons to
whom equal protect ion must be accorde d, and has never
before been constru ed as limitin g the territo ry within
which faciliti es accomp lishing e·q ual protect ion may be
used. Decisio ns constru ing the phrase are as fallows :
In Blake v. McClu ng, 172 U. S. 239, 260-1, the court
said:
"It is equally clear that the Virgin ia corpor ation
cannot rely upon the clause declari ng that no state
shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdi ction the
equal protec tion of the laws.' That prohib ition manifestly relates only to the denial by the State of equal
protect ion to person s 'within its jurisdi ction.' "
In Southe rn Ry. Co. v. Greene , 216 U. S. 400, 417, the
court said:
"We, therefo re, reach the conclu sion that the corporatio n plainti ff, under the conditi ons which we
have detaile d, is, within the meanin g of the fourtee nth
amend ment, a person within the jurisdi ction of the
State of Alabam a, and entitle d to be protect ed agains t
any statute of the state which depriv es it of the equal
protec tion of the laws."
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In Phila delph ia Fire Ass'n v. New York , 119 U. S. 110,
116, the court said:
"The provi sion of the fourt eenth amen dmen t,
which went into effect in July, 1868, is, that no state
shall 'deny to any perso n withi n its jurisd iction the
equal prote ction of the laws. ' The first quest ion
which arises is, whet her this corpo ration was a person withi n the jurisd iction of the State of New York,
with refere nce to the subje ct of contr overs y
and withi n the mean ing of the amen dmen t."
In Yick Wo v. Hopk ins, 118 U. S. 356, 369, the court
said:
''The fourt eenth amen dmen t to the Cons titution is not confi ned to the prote ction of citize ns. It
says: 'Nor shall any State depri ve any perso n of life,
libert y, or prope rty witho ut due proce ss of law; nor
deny to any perso n withi n its jurisd iction the equal
prote ction of the laws. ' These provi sions are unive rsal in their appli cation , to all perso ns withi n the
territ orial jurisd iction , witho ut regar d to any differ ences of race, of color, or of natio nality ; and the
equal prote ction of the laws is a pledg e of the protectio n of equal laws. "
In Quak er City Cab Co. v. Penn sylva nia, 277 U. S.
389, 400, the court said:
"The equal prote ction claus e exten ds to foreig n
corpo ration s withi n the jurisd iction of the state and
safeg uards to them prote ction of laws appli ed equal ly
to all in the same situat ion. Plain tiff in error is entitled in Penn sylva nia to the same prote ction of equal
laws that natur al perso ns withi n its jurisd iction have
a right to dema nd unde r like circu mstan ces."
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To the same effect are the following:

Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U. S. 544, 550.
National Council of United American Mechanics
v. State Council of Virginia, 203 U. S. 151,
163.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway c·o. v.
Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59.
12 Corpus Juris 1142.
It is respectfully submitted that the meaning thus
applied to the phrase "within its jurisdiction" by these
decisions is correct, and that the words were not intended,
and should not be construed, to define or limit the place
where the State must supply the facilities fulfilling equal
protection.
If in tl1is case the court will give to the phrase
"within its jurisdiction" only the meaning heretofore applied, the result will be to hold that Missouri may not
deny to petitioner, who is a "person within its jurisdiction," facilities for legal education equal to those pro-vided for its white citizens. This proposition has never
been denied by the state court or by the respondents.
But this court has departed from its settled construction, and has now for the first time construed the phrase
"within its jurisdiction" as defining, not merely the person to whom equal protection must be accorded, but the
place or territory within which the facilities implementing
equal protection must be used.
The construction formerly applied by the court will
not require the State to provide facilities for legal education for petitioner within the State, and will only require
that the facilities provided for him shall be equal to those
provided .for white citizens.
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We respectfully call attention to the fact that no authority is cited for the construction now adopted. We
believe no authority exists.
It is also a fact that the construction applied by the
court was not presented or even suggested in petitioner's
brief-for which reason it was not discussed in respondents' brief. So the case is decided upon a question not
actually presented. The gravity of the question is apparent. We respectfully submit that a question so fundamental and of such far-reaching effect should be finally
decided by this Honorable Court only after full presentation.
II.
The co,u rt overlooks the right of Missouri to enter into
a co,n tract with ano ther state to supply the facilities fo,r
le·g al education to Gaines.
1

1

1

The court in its decision overlooks the fact that the
Missouri statute (Sec. 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929) authorizes
the curators of Lincoln University to contract with the
university of an adjacent state to supply Gaines the facilities for a legal education equal to those afforded white
students at the University of Missouri. The constitution
recognizes that states will contract with each other (Art.
I, Sec. 10). Such contract need not be in writing, and may
be a mere verbal understanding (Holmes v. Jennison, 14
Pet. 540, 572). The State of Missouri has the right to enter into a contract with another state, the adjacent State
of Illinois, for example, to furnish Gaines the facilities
for a legal education, and such a contract is valid even
without the consent of Congress. In Virginia v. Tennessee., 148 U. S. 503, 518, the court said:
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"There are many matters upon which different
states may agree that can in no respect concern the
United States. If, for instance, Virginia should come
into possession and ownership of a small parcel of
land in New York which the latter state might desire
to acquire as a site for a public building, it would
hardly be deemed essential for the latter state to obtain the consent of Congress before it could make a
valid agreement with Virginia for the purchase of
the land. If Massachusett s, in forwarding its exhibits
to the World's Fair at Chicago, should desire to transport them a part of the distance over the Erie Canal,
it would hardly be deemed essential for that state
to obtain the consent of Congress before it could contract with New York for the transportatio n of the
exhibits through that state in that way. If the bordering line of two states should cross some malarious
and disease-produ cing district, there could be no possible reason, on any conceivable public grounds, to
to obtain the consent of Congress for the bordering states to agree to unite in draining the district,
and thus removing the cause of disease. So in case
of threatened invasion of cholera, plague, or other
causes of sickness and death, it would be the height
of absurdity to hold that the threatened states could
not unite in providing means to prevent and repel
the invasion of pestilence, without obtaining the consent of Congress, which might not be at the time in
session."
To the same effect are Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155,
168-170; Dodge v. Briggs, 27 Fed. 160, 171, and 59 C. J.
36-37.

III.
The co,u rt overlooks. the relationship of principal and
agent which would exist between Missouri and the· university of an adjacent state·.

The State of Missouri in furnishing the facilities for
higher education must necessarily act through some
agency. The court in its_decision overlooks the fact that _
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when the curators of Lincoln University carry out the
authority in them vested by the Missouri statute (Sec.
9622, R. S. Mo., 1929) and arrange or contract with, let
us say, the University of Illinois, for Gaines's attendance
at the law school of that institution, and pay said university all it demands for such services, to-wit, the full tuition, the University of Illinois thereby becomes the agent
of the State of Missouri to give Gaines the required education. And since Missouri makes this arrangement and
pays the full price requested by Illinois therefor, it is
the State of Missouri that gives Gaines the equal protection, and not the State of Illinois. It therefore is erroneous to say, as the opinion states, that "no state can
be excused from performance by what another state may
do or fail to do.'' Such a statement would be applicable
if Missouri did not enter into the picture ( as here), as
the principal paying the price to the University of Illinois,
which is the agent receiving the fee for services in supplying facilities for legal education.
Contracts of this kind are valid contracts although
the performance thereof is to occur outside the territorial
boundaries of Missouri (Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.
S. 503, 518; Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155, 168-170;
Dodge v. Briggs, 27 Fed. 160, 171; 59 Corpus Juris 36-37).
And so Iong as this agency complies with the arrangement which Missouri makes with it for the education of
Gaines, there can be no denial to Gaines of the equal
protection of the law. The State of Illinois is satisfied
with such an arrangement, as indicated by the fact that
it receives negro students from other states (R. 87-88);
and Gaines cannot raise any objection on its behalf. So
long as this arrangement provides Gaines facilities for
legal education substantially equal to those provided for
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white students, he has not been deprived of any constitutional right and cannot complain.

IV.
The co,u rt ove·r looks its well-established canon of co,nstructio,n 0 f the f o,u rtee·n th amendment.
1

With the greatest respect we feel constrained to suggest that in approaching the solution of the problem here
involved the court failed to consider and give effect to the
well-established canon of construction so clearly and ably
stated by the late Justice Holmes speaking for the unanimous court in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.
104, 110. Justice Holmes there said that"we must be cautious about pressing the broad words
of the fourteenth amendment to a drily logical ex. treme. Many laws which it would be vain to ask the
court to overthrow could be shown, easily enough, to
transgress a scholastic interpretation of one or another of the great guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
They more or less limit the liberty of the individual
or they diminish property to a certain extent. We
have few scientifically certain criteria of legislation,
and as it often is difficult to mark the line where
what is called the police power of the states is limited
by the Constitution of the United States, judges
should be slow to read into the latter a nolumus
mutare as against the law-making power."
The construction of the equal protection clause applied by the court in the case at bar fails to comply with
the above canon of constrL1ction, which this court has for
a long time heretofore observed in measuring state laws
with the yardstick contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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v.
The court overlooks the effect o,f the failure of Gaines
to apply to the curators o,f Lincoln University.

The court in its decision overlooks the settled rule
that no one is entitled to judicial relief until the prescribed
administrati ve remedy has been exhausted. In Highland Farms Dairy v.· Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 616-617, this
court through Justice Cardozo said:
"One who is required to take out a license will
not be heard to complain, in advance of application,
that there is danger of refusal. Lehon v. Atlanta,
242 U. S. 53, 56; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 562.
He should apply and see what happens."
In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303
_U. S. 41, 50-51, this court through Mr. Justice Brandeis
held that the contention of the shipbuilding corporation
was-

"at war with the long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for
a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrati ve remedy has been exhausted."
To the same effect are Petroleum Exp.Zoration, Inc., v.
Public Service Commission, 304 U. S. 209, 222-3; Bourjois, Inc., v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183, 188; Natural Gas
Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 309; Goldsmith v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 123; Gundling v. Chicago,
177 U. S. 183, 186; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 561~2;
Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 468, 471; Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53, 55-6; Lieberman ·v.
Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 562, and Ex parte Virginia
Commissione rs, 112 U. S. 177.

The record shows that Gaines deliberately refused to
avail himself of the provisions made by the state for his
benefit, by refusing to apply to the Lincoln University
curators, the agency of the state charged with the furnishing of higher education to its negro citizens (R. 74, 82,
83, 84, 85-86, 218-219, 222). He even declined under oath
to say whether he would have attended a law school i1i
Lincoln University if one had been established there on
a par with the law school at the University of Missouri.
This appears at page 88 of the record, as follows:
"Q. At page 69 of your deposition, do you recall my
asking you if a good law school were established at
Lincoln University, one that would be on a par with
that at Missouri University, whether you would attend it, and you refused to answer-didn't you?
. "
A . Y es, sir.

This attitude on the part of Gaines must leave this
court as well as the State of Missouri in the dark as to
the good faith of Gaines's application.
We respectfully submit that the court should have
decided this question. The mention in the opinion of what
the President of Lincoln University wrote Gaines does not
answer the point, because the president had no power to
act or bind the board of curators. The Board of Curators
of Lincoln University alone had the power under the statutes (Sec. 9618, 9622, R. S. Mo., 1929), to provide legal
education at Lincoln University. Under the above authorities it was the duty of Gaines to apply to the Lincoln
curators, and his failure to do so leaves him in no
position to ask judicial relief.
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VI.
The far-reach ing effect of the court's decision.

The principle of race separatio n in educatio nal facilities is firmly establish ed in many of the states. It is
founded in long-esta blished and deeply-r ooted tradition .
It is a condition , not a theory.
While maintain ing this tradition seven of these
states, exercisin g their police power, in a good faith attempt to solve this difficult problem in a manner_ to conserve the general welfare of both races, have provided
for race separatio n in higher educatio n, and have enacted
laws designed in good faith to give the negro equal facilities for higher educatio n-by out-of-st ate instructi on. (Of
these states only Missouri •has establish ed a state univer•
sity for negroes within its borders. ) 'rhe laws of these
seven states are printed in the appendix to petitione r's
brief (pages _25-37). Those laws are in actual operation ,
to the reasonab le satisfact ion of all fair-min ded persons.
So far as Kentuck y, Marylan d, Oklahom a, Tennesse e,
Virginia and West Virginia are concerne d ( each of which
has made provisio n for out-of-st ate instructi on but has
no negro universit y within its borders) , the decision means
that these states will be compelle d either to admit negroes
to sit with white boys and girls in their state universit ies,
or to build separate negro universi ties within their borders to take care of any demand for higher educatio n of
negroes wl1ich might arise. Because of long-sett led and
deeply-r ooted tradition s, and through a well-fou nded fear
of the conseque nces of any change, it is reasonab ly certain that those states cannot and will not abolish race separation. So the only choice open to them is either to
abolish their state universi ties and depend upon private
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institutions for the education of white students, or to
build negro universities within their borders to be ready
to supply, immediately on demand, higher education for
negroes in every branch of learning taught in the state
university-a nd this too even though there may never
have been -any demand for education in some, or any, of
those branches, and even though it cannot reasonably be
foreseen that there ever will be such a demand. The
dilemma forced upon these states by the opinion is obviously a serious one.
The effect
of the decision so far as Missouri is con,
cerned is twofold:
First. The State must at once establish in Lincoln
University each and every course of instruction available
at the University of Missouri, whether there has ever
been any demand therefor by any Missouri negro or not.
This because conceivably such a demand may arise; and
if it does arise the State must at once be in a position to
satisfy it. The result will be a number of new departments in Lincoln University with idle teaching staffs and
empty classrooms.
Second. If the State should desire to expand the curriculum in the University of Missouri by the addition of
new courses of instruction, for which there has arisen a
demand from white students but for which there is absolutely no demand from negroes, then the State must at
once establisl1 the same courses of study at Lincoln University-agai n with idle teaching staffs and no students.
The natural economic result would be to deter the State
from the normal expansion of its higher educational institutions.
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The problem presented here is intensely practical, and
must be solved with due regard for the actual needs of the
two races, rather than upon the basis of purely theoretical
considerations. As stated in the dissenting opinion:
"The problem presented obviously is a difficult
and highly practical one. A fair effort to solve it has
been made by offering adequate opportunity for study
when sought in good faith. The State should not be
unduly hampered through theorization inadequately
restrained by experience."
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully urged that
this petition for a rehearing be granted, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri be, upon further
consideration, affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAMS,

FRED

L.
L.

NICK

T.

CAVE,

FRED

ENGLISH.,

S. HOGSETT,
Counsel for Respondents.
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